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Inﬂ  ation expectations play a critical role in the  • 
conduct of monetary policy, providing timely and 
useful information with respect to the central 
bank’s credibility. Inﬂ  ation expectations are a key 
determinant of actual inﬂ  ation and are thus a 
crucial part of the analysis used by many central 
banks to generate inﬂ  ation forecasts.
Inﬂ  ation expectations in countries with explicit  • 
inﬂ  ation-targeting monetary policy regimes appear 
to be more forward looking and better anchored. 
During the 2008–09 period, despite the high 
volatility of short-term inﬂ  ation expectations, 
expectations for longer-term inﬂ  ation remained 
well anchored. 
As central banks seek to withdraw from the  • 
extraordinary measures enacted during the crisis, 
inﬂ  ation expectations will be monitored closely.
M
aintaining price stability is the key objective of 
most central banks, and the recent ﬁ  nancial 
crisis and global recession have produced 
important upside and downside risks to price stability. 
On the upside, inﬂ  ationary pressure could emerge if 
monetary policy rates are left too low for too long, 
if extraordinary measures are withdrawn too slowly, 
or if ﬁ  scal budgets are not consolidated in a timely 
manner. On the downside are deﬂ  ationary pressures 
from substantial and prolonged output gaps. Managing 
these respective risks to price stability is a key concern 
for central banks, and inﬂ  ation expectations can 
provide them with important information as they 
consider exit strategies from extraordinary measures 
and the normalization of monetary policy. Moreover, 
to achieve their goal of price stability on an ongoing 
basis, it is crucial that central banks manage inﬂ  ation 
expectations through policy actions. 
This article explores the role of inﬂ  ation expectations 
in the conduct of monetary policy. First, we review the 
various measures of inﬂ  ation expectations that are used 
by central banks, including survey- and market-based 
indicators, and consider their respective advantages 
and disadvantages. Second, we examine why inﬂ  ation 
expectations are so important in the conduct of 
monetary policy: namely, their crucial role in the 
framework used by central banks to understand, 
forecast, and control inﬂ  ation. We then explore the 
role of inﬂ  ation expectations as an indicator of central 
bank credibility. Simply, if economic agents view the 
central bank as credible, inﬂ  ation expectations are more 
likely to be well anchored, further enhancing the effect-
iveness of monetary policy. Interestingly, institutional 
arrangements, such as adopting inﬂ  ation targeting, 
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credibility is highlighted in the presence of inﬂ  ation 
shocks: well-anchored inﬂ  ation expectations can help 
the central bank look past temporary shocks to inﬂ  ation, 
and required adjustments to the central bank’s monetary 
policy instruments are also greatly reduced. 
To shed further light on this subject, we analyze the 
behaviour of inﬂ  ation, and inﬂ  ation expectations, 
through the lens of the past two years—a challenging 
episode for central banks, as inﬂ  ation quickly rose and 
then fell through 2008 and 2009. We note, however, 
that inﬂ  ation expectations in most countries remained 
remarkably well anchored, despite the massive shocks 
that were affecting the economy, thus demonstrating 
the credibility of many central banks. In addition, the 
maintenance of well-anchored inﬂ  ation expectations 
assisted the recovery, as the economy avoided a 
potentially destabilizing deﬂ  ationary spiral. Thus, the 
episode provides valuable lessons with respect to the 
critical importance of credibility and well-anchored 
inﬂ  ation expectations in the conduct of monetary 
policy. From this experience, we offer policy conclu-
sions and note the need to improve measures of 
inﬂ  ation expectations. We also highlight the need to 
better understand how households and ﬁ  rms form 
inﬂ  ation expectations, and how those expectations 
affect price formation. 
Measuring Inﬂ  ation Expectations
Before examining the importance of inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions in the conduct of monetary policy, it is necessary 
to look at how they are measured in practice. There are 
two main sources of information on inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions: surveys and markets. Their relative strengths 
and weaknesses are considered in turn. 
Surveys 
Surveys of inﬂ  ation expectations consider three 
types of respondents: households, businesses, and 
professionals (the latter are often referred to as market 
participants or experts). Table 1 lists the most com-
monly referenced surveys, together with details on 
their structure.
1 Surveys typically ask respondents 
what they expect inﬂ  ation to be in the next 4 to 
8 quarters and in the next 5 to 10 years. Survey 
frequency varies from monthly to semi-annually, and 
1  For further detail on the Michigan survey, the Livingston Survey, and 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters, see Curtin (1996), Croushore 
(1997), and Croushore (1993), respectively.
most are available from the 1990s onwards.
2 Studies 
of inﬂ  ation expectations typically focus on the median 
range as the relevant indicator, since extreme obser-
vations may not be particularly informative. Disagree-
ment among respondents to the same survey can be 
useful at times, however, since it can be interpreted as 
disagreement in the population or as a proxy for 
inﬂ  ation uncertainty (Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers 
2003).
3 
There are two main sources of 
information on inﬂ  ation expectations: 
surveys and markets.
Most surveys are conducted at the national level: for 
example, in the United States, the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters, conducted quarterly by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Other examples 
include surveys by the University of Michigan, the 
Banco Central do Brasil, and the Bank of Japan. In 
Canada, the Conference Board of Canada conducts 
its Survey of Forecasters each quarter. The Confer-
ence Board forecasts are on a calendar-year basis, 
and the survey reports only the mean of respondents’ 
inﬂ  ation forecasts. The Bank of Canada’s quarterly 
Business Outlook Survey reports on consultations 
with about 100 ﬁ  rms across Canada in sectors that 
broadly reﬂ  ect the composition of the GDP. The survey 
asks ﬁ  rms their forecasts of annual consumer price 
index (CPI) inﬂ  ation over the next two years, and 
reports the responses grouped into four ranges: 
below 1 per cent, 1 to 2 per cent, 2 to 3 per cent, 
and above 3 per cent.
4 
International surveys, such as Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators, the IFO World Economic Survey, and 
Consensus Economics’ Consensus Forecast, allow 
for cross-country comparisons. The most widely used 
is the Consensus Forecast, which surveys a large 
cross-section of professional forecasters (currently 
more than 700 worldwide in more than 85 countries, 
including Canada), asking each one their predictions 
2  The Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior has been 
conducted quarterly since 1946, even though for the ﬁ  rst 20 years 
respondents were asked only whether they expected prices to rise, 
fall, or stay the same.
3  Disagreement about the future path of inﬂ  ation tends to rise with 
the inﬂ  ation rate or when inﬂ  ation changes sharply. Surveys of 
consumers usually reveal greater disagreement than surveys of 
economists, which show a smaller range of estimates across 
respondents.
4  The question on inﬂ  ation expectations in its current form has been 
part of the survey since 2001.
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Survey Participants Start date Frequency Organization Measures of inﬂ  ation expectations and horizon
United States
Michigan Survey of 
Consumer Attitudes 
500 to 700 
consumers
1978 Monthly University of Michigan Expected change in prices 12 months ahead




1981 Quarterly Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia 
GDP deﬂ  ator, CPI, PCE, and Core PCE: 
6 quarters ahead, 5 and 10 years ahead
Livingston Survey 48 
professionals
1946 Semi-annually Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia 
CPI: current quarter, 2 quarters ahead, 4 quarters ahead
Europe




1999 Quarterly  European Central Bank CPI: point estimates and density forecasts 





1985 Monthly European Commission Expected changes in consumer prices 12 months ahead
United Kingdom




2001 Quarterly  Bank of England 
and GfK/NOP
Expected change in shop prices 12 months ahead
Citigroup/YouGov 2,000 
consumers
2005 Monthly YouGov/Citigroup Expected change in consumer prices of goods 
12 months ahead 
Canada
Survey of Forecasters  500 ﬁ  rms  1985 Quarterly Conference Board 
of Canada
Percentage of ﬁ  rms expecting price increases 
over the next 6 months and for the next calendar year
Business Outlook 
Survey
100 ﬁ  rms 1997 Quarterly Bank of Canada Expected annual rate of CPI inﬂ  ation for the next 2 years
Japan
Bank of Japan Survey 3,000 
consumers
1993 Quarterly Bank of Japan Qualitative: will prices go up, down, or stay the same? 
And reference prices for judging change
Other





1991 Quarterly  IFO Research Center, w. 
support from the 
European Commission
Expected inﬂ  ation 6 months ahead
Consensus Economics 700 
professionals in 
85 countries
1989 Monthly Consensus 
Economics Inc.
 Inﬂ  ation for the current year, 
for next year, and for 5 to 10 years




1976 Monthly Aspen Publishers  Inﬂ  ation 0 to 7 quarters ahead for the United States, 
1 to 2 years ahead for other major economies




2001 Daily Banco do Brasil IPCA inﬂ  ation over the next 12 months
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long-term interest rates. 
Market-based measures 
Inﬂ  ation expectations can also be inferred from asset 
prices, such as break-even inﬂ  ation rates (BEIRs).
5 
The break-even inﬂ  ation rate is the difference between 
the nominal yield on a ﬁ  xed-rate bond and the real 
yield on an inﬂ  ation-linked (or real return) bond of the 
same term and maturity. Real return bonds, such as 
U.S. Treasury Inﬂ  ation-Protected Securities (TIPS) 
differ from non-indexed debt securities in that their 
principal is adjusted for changes in a speciﬁ  ed price 
index.
6 Such indexation protects the purchasing 
power of the principal, which will have the same real 
value at maturity in terms of the power to buy items in 
a consumption basket as when the security was 
originally issued. BEIRs are easily derived for the 
United States and the United Kingdom, which have 
the deepest and most liquid markets for both nominal 
and real return bonds and issue at a wide range of 
maturity points (and hence the longest time series for 
the widest range of forecast horizons). Break-even 
inﬂ  ation rates can also be calculated for Canada, 
France, and some other industrialized countries, but 
the data are much more limited. 
Advantages and disadvantages
Both measures of inﬂ  ation expectations have advan-
tages and disadvantages. Survey measures have 
three main advantages: (i) the breadth of coverage is 
large, including market participants, businesses, and 
households; (ii) some surveys have been conducted 
for many decades, allowing comparative analysis from 
previous inﬂ  ationary (or deﬂ  ationary) episodes; and 
(iii) surveys minimize market distortions, because they 
avoid certain biases, such as liquidity risk, inﬂ  ation 
risk, and institutional distortions, that can affect 
market-based measures.
Surveys also have several shortcomings: (i) they are 
often conducted only quarterly or semi-annually and 
may therefore miss recent changes in inﬂ  ation expect-
ations. There are also lags between the time they are 
taken and publication of their results; (ii) surveys may 
be biased, since households may overweight price 
changes for frequently purchased goods and services, 
5  Inﬂ  ation-indexed swaps could also be used to infer inﬂ  ation 
expectations. An inﬂ  ation-indexed swap is a derivative instrument 
where the payments under the contract depend on the value of an 
inﬂ  ation index, such as the CPI. 
6  In most cases, the index used is the CPI. A notable exception is the 
United Kingdom, where the Retail Prices Index is used.
such as gasoline and food;
7 (iii) comparison of survey 
results across countries is difﬁ  cult, given differences 
in survey methodologies; (iv) responses are equally 
weighted, irrespective of respondents’ ability to 
forecast inﬂ  ation; and (v) the answers of some survey 
respondents may be strategic: market participants 
may have incentives not to reveal private information 
and thus tend towards consensus forecasts.
Data from market-based measures have many 
advantages.
8 First, BEIRs and various other measures 
of inﬂ  ation expectations derived from asset prices are 
available daily. Second, market-based measures may 
reﬂ  ect agents’ expectations more accurately, since 
market participants “vote” with real money.
9 In addition, 
depending on the breadth and depth of the relevant 
markets, market-based measures can reveal inﬂ  ation 
expectations across a wider range of forecast horizons 
than surveys. 
There are, however, some concerns with BEIRs. They 
may suffer from the fact that the liquidity characteris-
tics of the two instruments (nominal and real return 
bonds) differ considerably: while there are deep and 
liquid markets for regular, nominal return bonds, this is 
less true for real return bonds, and their implied yield 
may therefore be biased because of a variable liquidity 
premium between the two.
10 Moreover, during times 
of market stress, a ﬂ  ight to quality might distort 
nominal yields disproportionately.
11 Institutional 
factors and self-selection may also distort the infor-
mation content of BEIRs, since some investors, such 
as pension funds and insurance ﬁ  rms, may have 
strong preferences for real return bonds,
12 thus 
leading to a premium for those bonds. In addition, 
BEIRs might suffer from mismatched cash ﬂ  ows. 
While coupon payments on nominal bonds are ﬁ  xed, 
those on real return bonds rise with inﬂ  ation. This 
means that each bond will react differently to changes 
in the expected path and variance of the inﬂ  ation rate, 
biasing the BEIR. Finally, if the term structure of 
7  Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002) suggest that the bias in survey 
forecasts may vary across accelerating versus decelerating inﬂ  ation 
environments or across the business cycle.
8  For more details, see Christensen, Dion, and Reid (2004).
9  This is important in the current environment, since feedback 
between expectations of deﬂ  ation and postponed consumption and 
investment would begin only if people act on those expectations.
10  In some markets, inﬂ  ation-indexed swaps are more liquid than real 
return bonds, which suggests that inﬂ  ation-indexed swaps may be a 
more reliable measure of inﬂ  ation expectations.
11  During the ﬁ  nancial crisis in 2008, the ﬂ  ight to safety implied a large 
premium for nominal bonds, leading to a large distortion in the BEIR.
12  For example, insurance ﬁ  rms may need to hedge liabilities that are 
indexed to inﬂ  ation.
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and this bias will be greater at shorter horizons.
13
Are survey and market measures able to give a reliable 
picture of current inﬂ  ation expectations? In the 
Canadian context, Christensen, Dion, and Reid (2004) 
ﬁ  nd that the BEIR in Canada is not a reliable measure 
of inﬂ  ation expectations because of the maturity and 
liquidity characteristics of Real Return Bonds. Simply, 
Canada’s Real Return Bonds have a 30-year maturity 
and are considerably less liquid than conventional 
30-year bonds, which leads to frequent distortions in 
the measure of expected inﬂ  ation. For the United States, 
Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) ﬁ  nd that survey data 
outperform market-based measures, times-series 
ARIMA models, and regressions using data on real 
economic activity. Consequently, the most recent 
evidence suggests that surveys may be a more reliable 
guide to inﬂ  ation expectations for the United States 
and Canada.
Inﬂ  ation Expectations and 
Monetary Policy
Measures of inﬂ  ation expectations play a key role in 
the conduct of monetary policy since they provide 
useful signals with respect to the credibility of the 
central bank and its long-run inﬂ  ation objective. 
Inﬂ  ation expectations are also a crucial part of the 
analysis used by many central banks to generate 
inﬂ  ation forecasts. Inﬂ  ation expectations are one of 
the main drivers of current inﬂ  ation, because expected 
inﬂ  ation inﬂ  uences current wage negotiations, price 
setting, and ﬁ  nancial contracting for investment. 
Because of this link, central banks can affect current 
and future inﬂ  ation by better anchoring agents’ 
expectations of long-term inﬂ  ation. 
Inﬂ  ation expectations and central bank 
credibility 
The analytical framework used by most central banks 
assumes that economic agents are mainly forward 
looking and rational, which has strongly inﬂ  uenced the 
design of monetary policy (Bernanke 2007). In this 
framework (and in practice), central banks can manage 
and stabilize inﬂ  ation expectations, and hence inﬂ  ation, 
through various factors, including the choice of policy 
regime, their actions, and their communications. For 
instance, an inﬂ  ation-targeting regime in which the 
central bank commits to keep inﬂ  ation at a speciﬁ  c 
13  A detailed explanation of this phenomenon can be found in 
Christensen, Dion, and Reid (2004).
rate or range over a speciﬁ  ed period provides a clear, 
measurable commitment and a performance target. 
This policy commitment sends a clear signal to the 
public and to market participants about the priority of 
monetary policy and thus helps to anchor inﬂ  ation 
expectations.
14 But having the correct regime is not 
enough: delivery is key. Credibility requires policy 
actions (Mishkin 2007), since these actions demon-
strate the central bank’s commitment to price stability 
and its ability to achieve it—making inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions relatively insensitive to incoming data. Lastly, 
central banks can improve their credibility through 
clear and effective communication. Clarity about the 
goals of the central bank, and how it plans to achieve 
them, can further anchor inﬂ  ation expectations, and 
thus inﬂ  ation.
Central banks can affect current 
and future inﬂ  ation by better 
anchoring agents’ expectations 
of long-term inﬂ  ation. 
A review of the empirical literature
The theoretical basis for the use of inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions is clear: well-anchored inﬂ  ation expectations can 
help the central bank achieve its inﬂ  ation objective. 
Whether this is true in practice is essentially an 
empirical question. To this end, there is a large 
literature on the interaction between inﬂ  ation, inﬂ  ation 
expectations, and the conduct of monetary policy. 
Inﬂ  ation persistence and inﬂ  ation expectations
Inﬂ  ation persistence or inertia is of concern to central 
banks, since it can inhibit the bank’s ability to achieve 
its inﬂ  ation objective. In particular, high persistence may 
suggest that economic agents form inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions in a backward-looking (instead of forward-look-
ing) manner. Backward-looking inﬂ  ation expectations 
could therefore indicate that a central bank’s credibil-
ity is low, potentially impairing the efﬁ  cacy of its actions. 
Not surprisingly, postwar inﬂ  ation data suggest that 
inﬂ  ation has often tended to be highly correlated with 
lagged inﬂ  ation; i.e., there is persistence in observed 
inﬂ  ation. While some persistence may be intrinsic to 
an economy, the level will likely decline if expectations 
14  Price-level targeting could have a further stabilizing effect on 
inﬂ  ation expectations, and this has been an area of active research 
by the Bank of Canada. See Ambler (2009) for a review of the 
research. 
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credible monetary policy (Woodford 2006). Simply, 
the greater the importance of forward-looking 
expectations, the less persistent inﬂ  ation should be 
(Rudd and Whelan 2007; Sims 2008).
15 Consequently, 
the question arises as to whether the institutional 
framework for monetary policy, through its effect on 
inﬂ  ation expectations, can lower inﬂ  ation persistence.
Many have argued that a simple way to make agents 
more forward looking is to introduce an inﬂ  ation target. 
Several recent empirical studies test whether the 
institutional framework affects inﬂ  ation persistence. 
Benati (2008) considers several alternative monetary 
policy regimes in a recent cross-country study, and 
ﬁ  nds that for inﬂ  ation-targeting (IT) countries—Canada, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand—
inﬂ  ation was persistent prior to the adoption of the IT 
regime. But since the adoption of IT, lagged inﬂ  ation is 
no longer a statistically signiﬁ  cant predictor of current 
inﬂ  ation: i.e., persistence has declined. Likewise, 
inﬂ  ation persistence in the euro area has declined 
since the adoption of the euro.
16 More recently, 
Mendes and Murchison (2009–10) examine inﬂ  ation 
persistence in Canada and also ﬁ  nd a substantial 
decline in persistence relative to the 1980s. They 
emphasize the importance of the adoption of the IT 
target in 1991. Results for the United States are more 
ambiguous, however, and seem sensitive to which 
measure of inﬂ  ation is used. Benati (2008) ﬁ  nds that 
inﬂ  ation measured by the GDP deﬂ  ator and the 
Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price 
index shows considerable persistence in the United 
States, even after 1995, while estimates of CPI 
inﬂ  ation show almost no persistence. Benati’s study 
and others suggest that past inﬂ  ation experience 
inﬂ  uences current inﬂ  ation, as well as expectations 
15  This literature also includes related work by Altissimo, Mojon, and 
Zaffaroni (2009); Cechetti et al. (2007); and Kozicki and Tinsley 
(2003). The appropriate interpretation for the persistence of inﬂ  ation 
is the source of an ongoing debate, particularly among Woodford 
(2006) and Rudd and Whelan (2007). While Rudd and Whelan are 
skeptical of rational expectations to describe how expectations are 
formed, they nevertheless emphasize that the role of expectations in 
the inﬂ  ation process is “crucial” (p.32).
16  The number and timing of policy regimes is exogenously determined 
in Benati’s model, and he assumes a single regime from 1971 to 
1991. Benati’s ﬁ  ndings of very high inﬂ  ation persistence in pre-IT 
periods may reﬂ  ect a failure to adequately control for changes in 
trend inﬂ  ation for Canada. Crawford, Meh, and Terajima (2009) allow 
for endogenous timing of regime changes and ﬁ  nd that prior to 
inﬂ  ation targeting Canada’s inﬂ  ation persistence was considerably 
lower than Benati’s estimate.  
about future inﬂ  ation.
17 However, the extent of this 
inﬂ  uence appears to decline substantially as the 
monetary policy regime’s commitment to price 
stability strengthens.
18 
Anchoring inﬂ  ation expectations 
As discussed above, uncertainty about the central 
bank’s objective, or its commitment to a target, can 
affect expectations of long-run inﬂ  ation. A key argu-
ment in favour of inﬂ  ation targeting is that it leads to 
better anchoring of inﬂ  ation expectations. Several 
studies empirically test this assertion, which is also 
an implication of the rational-expectations model: if 
expectations are perfectly anchored, then long-run 
inﬂ  ation expectations should not respond to current 
inﬂ  ation (especially periods of higher-than-expected 
current inﬂ  ation) or to other news about macro-
economic conditions. 
Empirical studies on the United States generally ﬁ  nd that 
its inﬂ  ation expectations have become more stable since 
the early 1980s, but they remain somewhat sensitive 
to current shocks. Stock and Watson (2007) ﬁ  nd that 
changes in the trend component of U.S. inﬂ  ation are 
highly persistent, but that the variation in trend inﬂ  ation 
has declined substantially since 1983. This implies that 
unexpected changes to inﬂ  ation are much less likely 
to persist in the United States than in the past and, 
thus, that inﬂ  ation expectations have become better 
anchored. Likewise, the response of inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions to shocks from the macroeconomy and from 
monetary policy has declined over the period, as has 
the volatility of inﬂ  ation expectations (Clark and Davig 
2008). Nevertheless, there remains enough variability 
in trend U.S. inﬂ  ation for Bernanke (2007) to conclude 
that inﬂ  ation expectations continue to be imperfectly 
anchored. 
17  Other evidence for the United States is mixed: Rudd and Whelan 
(2007) do not ﬁ  nd that U.S. inﬂ  ation is less persistent after the 
Volcker disinﬂ  ation. This is consistent with research by Kozicki and 
Tinsley (2005, 2009), who ﬁ  nd that it took a considerable period to 
build monetary policy credibility following the Great Inﬂ  ation of the 
1970s. They argue that this was partly due to the lack of a clear 
inﬂ  ation target. Cogley and Sbordone (2005, 2008), however, ﬁ  nd 
that inﬂ  ation persistence in the United States is minimal after 
controlling for shifts in trend inﬂ  ation.
18  Improvements in central bank credibility appear to be linked primarily 
to the choice of an inﬂ  ation-targeting regime, rather than to additional 
communication or transparency. A few central banks, in the belief 
that greater transparency would help anchor expectations, have 
published their policy interest rate path. Andersson and Hofmann 
(2009) assess whether these forward guidance strategies of the 
central banks of New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have helped 
anchor expectations of long-term inﬂ  ation. They ﬁ  nd that all three 
countries already had well-anchored inﬂ  ation expectations and that 
publishing the interest rate path, on its own, did not improve the 
degree to which those expectations were anchored.
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also suggest imperfect anchoring: Gürkaynak, Sack, 
and Swanson (2005) demonstrate that forward U.S. 
interest rates at long horizons react signiﬁ  cantly to 
various macroeconomic and monetary policy sur-
prises. Similarly, Potter and Rosenberg (2007) ﬁ  nd 
that shocks to short-run inﬂ  ation expectations (2 to 
5 years) continue to pass through to measures of 
long-run inﬂ  ation expectations (9 to 10 years). 
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005, 2009) study the Great 
Inﬂ  ation of the 1970s and the post-Volcker disinﬂ  ation 
period in detail, and conclude that the lack of an 
explicit monetary policy objective in the United States 
contributed to unanchored inﬂ  ation expectations well 
into the late 1980s. In contrast, they show that after 
the Bundesbank announced medium-term targets for 
money growth in the mid-1970s, bond market measures 
of German inﬂ  ation expectations soon began to track 
the Bundesbank’s target.
19 Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) 
ﬁ  nd that private sector expectations were slow to adjust 
to the lower-inﬂ  ation regime in the United States, even 
though actual inﬂ  ation declined quite quickly after 1979. 
They interpret their results as consistent with an initial 
lack of credibility regarding the Federal Reserve’s long-
term commitment to low and stable inﬂ  ation following 
the high-inﬂ  ation episodes in the 1970s and 1980s.
Several cross-country studies 
indicate that, as with inﬂ  ation 
persistence, inﬂ  ation expectations 
seem better anchored in countries 
with inﬂ  ation-targeting regimes. 
Recent international comparisons also provide evidence 
on the importance of the monetary policy regime for 
anchoring expectations. Several cross-country studies 
indicate that, as with inﬂ  ation persistence, inﬂ  ation 
expectations seem better anchored in countries with 
inﬂ  ation-targeting regimes. These studies ﬁ  nd that, 
unlike non-targeting countries, inﬂ  ation expectations 
in IT countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and Sweden, are not correlated to actual inﬂ  ation, nor 
are they as sensitive to macroeconomic news or 
19  At the end of 1974, the Bundesbank began a regime ofﬁ  cially 
described as money targeting; however, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) 
argue that inﬂ  ation, rather than money growth, seemed to be the 
actual target variable.
monetary policy surprises.
20 Overall, the existing 
research implies that expectations of long-term 
inﬂ  ation in the United States are stable but imperfectly 
anchored, while countries with explicit inﬂ  ation targets 
appear to have better-anchored expectations of 
long-term inﬂ  ation. Moreover, better-anchored inﬂ  ation 
expectations lead to lower inﬂ  ation persistence.
Other inﬂ  uences on inﬂ  ation expectations
The importance of credibility and the monetary policy 
regime for anchoring inﬂ  ation expectations may ignore 
other important features of the inﬂ  ation process, such 
as relative prices, especially those for food and energy, 
which are beyond the immediate control of the central 
bank. Clark and Davig (2008) ﬁ  nd that shocks to food 
prices have a signiﬁ  cant and persistent effect on 
expectations of long-run inﬂ  ation in the United States. 
Energy prices, however, were not found to have a 
signiﬁ  cant impact.
21 Galati, Poelhekke, and Zhou (2008) 
test whether the sharp increases in food and commodity 
prices that occurred between 2006 and mid-2008 led 
to a de-anchoring of inﬂ  ation expectations in the euro 
area. Employing market data on interest rate swaps 
and inﬂ  ation swaps (a more liquid market than inﬂ  ation-
indexed bonds) to measure inﬂ  ation expectations in 
the euro area, they ﬁ  nd evidence that inﬂ  ation expect-
ations became more sensitive to inﬂ  ation news after 
June 2007, suggesting some drift in the inﬂ  ation 
expectations of market participants away from the 
ECB’s target. This evidence suggests that policy-
makers must not take well-anchored inﬂ  ation expect-
ations for granted.
Recent Trends in Inﬂ  ation 
Expectations
The 2008–09 period provides an excellent lens 
through which to examine the importance of inﬂ  ation 
expectations for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Survey data: History and the crisis
The historical behaviour of inﬂ  ation expectations has 
evolved largely in line with the theory presented above: 
as central bank credibility has improved, inﬂ  ation 
20 See for example, Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); Gürkaynak, 
Levin, and Swanson (2006); Gürkaynak et al. (2006); and Beechey, 
Johannsen, and Levin (2008).
21 The authors point out that energy prices are volatile and that 
forecasters may, therefore, expect their movements to be transitory 
and may not place much weight on price changes. Food prices, 
however, tend to be more persistent and also make up a larger share 
of the CPI basket, which may lead forecasters to incorporate 
food-price movements into their expectations more readily. 
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presents the mean and standard deviation for actual 
CPI inﬂ  ation and for inﬂ  ation expectations 4 quarters 
ahead, 8 quarters ahead, and 5 to 10 years ahead, for 
seven advanced economies and the euro area. The 
data are divided into three periods: period I ranges 
from the second half of 1994 to the ﬁ  rst half of 1999, 
period II from the second half of 1999 to the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2004, and period III from the second half of 2004 
to the ﬁ  rst half of 2009. As a general trend, the mean 
and variance of inﬂ  ation expectations converged over 
time to the mean and variance of actual inﬂ  ation, 
especially in the 1994–99 and 1999–2004 periods. 
Moreover, as the forecast horizon becomes longer, 
expectations are much closer to actual inﬂ  ation. 
Importantly, as a potential signal of growing central 
bank credibility and well–anchored inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions, the standard deviation of the inﬂ  ation forecasts 
5 to 10 years ahead for most countries has fallen 
sharply over the past 10 years. Canada is an exception, 
since inﬂ  ation expectations and actual inﬂ  ation had 
already fallen signiﬁ  cantly by 1994, and therefore the 
improvement over the periods considered in the table 
is smaller than for other countries. 
An examination of more recent data provides 
valuable insights into the importance of well-anchored 
inﬂ  ation expectations. Survey data from Consensus 
Economics for Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the euro area show that since 2007, 
expectations of short-run inﬂ  ation have been quite 
volatile (Chart 1). In particular, the sharp and seem-
ingly persistent rise in energy, food, and commodity 
prices in 2008 led to higher headline inﬂ  ation, a 
feature that was reﬂ  ected in rising expectations of 
shorter-term inﬂ  ation. For example, in mid-2008, 
expectations for inﬂ  ation 4 quarters ahead reached 
more than 3 per cent in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, over 2.5 per cent in the euro area, 
and increased in Canada but to slightly less than 
Table 2:  The development of inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation expectations
Canada Euro area Japan Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States
mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Actual Inﬂ  ation 
(CPI y/y)
 
I 1.4 0.7 1.8 0.6 0.5 0.9 2.1 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.6 2.0 0.5 2.4 0.6
II 2.4 0.9 2.1 0.4 -0.6 0.4 2.2 1.4 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.3 2.5 0.8
III 2.0 0.7 2.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 2.1 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.2 0.9 2.5 0.8 2.9 1.6




I 1.8 0.3 - - 0.4 0.6 2.9 0.4 2.0 1.1 1.0 0.2 2.8 0.5 2.8 0.4
II 2.0 0.3 1.6 0.2 -0.4 0.3 1.9 0.6 1.9 0.4 1.1 0.4 2.3 0.2 2.3 0.4
III 1.8 0.6 1.8 0.5 0.1 0.6 2.0 0.7 1.7 0.9 1.0 0.4 2.3 0.9 2.2 1.1




I 2.0 0.3 - - 0.8 0.6 2.6 0.5 2.4 0.8 1.2 0.0 3.1 0.6 3.0 0.4
II 2.0 0.1 1.7 0.1 -0.2 0.5 2.2 0.2 2.1 0.3 1.3 0.2 2.3 0.1 2.4 0.3
III 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.3 0.6 0.3 2.0 0.3 1.9 0.3 1.2 0.3 2.5 0.3 2.2 0.2
Expected inﬂ  ation 




I 2.0 0.3 - - 1.4 0.5 2.1 0.1 2.4 0.5 1.9 0.2 3.0 0.4 3.0 0.4
II 2.0 0.1 1.9 0.1 0.8 0.4 2.3 0.2 2.0 0.0 1.6 0.1 2.3 0.1 2.5 0.1
III 2.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.3 0.2 2.3 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.6 0.2 2.3 0.2
Note: Period I runs from the second half of 1994 to the ﬁ  rst half of 1999; period II runs from the second half of 1999 to the ﬁ  rst half of 2004; and period III runs from the second half of 2004 
to the ﬁ  rst half of 2009.
Source: Consensus Economics
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in mid-2008 was even more prevalent for emerging-
market economies (Chart 2). Following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, the economic and ﬁ  nancial 
turbulence intensiﬁ  ed, and expectations for inﬂ  ation 
4 quarters ahead fell sharply, actually turning negative 
in the United States (December 2008 to March 2009), 
the United Kingdom (December 2008), and Sweden 
(March 2009). This was partly due to the collapse in 
commodity prices and fears of a sharp recession. In 
Canada, inﬂ  ation expectations 4 quarters ahead also 
fell, although to a lesser extent. The sharp decline in 
expectations of short-run inﬂ  ation at the height of 
the credit crisis suggests that market participants in 
some countries expected deﬂ  ation in 2009, albeit that 
expectation was short lived. In fact, inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions began to rise again later in 2009 as economies 
began to stabilize, although they currently remain 
lower than the levels prior to the crisis. 
Despite the high volatility of short-term inﬂ  ation 
expectations, expectations for longer-term inﬂ  ation 
remained better anchored. Expectations for inﬂ  ation 
8 quarters ahead declined much less. During the most 
severe part of the crisis, the Bank of Canada’s Busi-
ness Outlook Survey of inﬂ  ation expectations 2 years 
ahead found that over 40 per cent of ﬁ  rms expected 
inﬂ  ation below 1 per cent, but by the second quarter 
of 2009 that share had dropped back to just 11 per 
cent of respondents (Chart 3). Furthermore, expecta-
tions for long-term inﬂ  ation (5 to 10 years ahead) 
remained essentially ﬂ  at in most countries (ranging 
from 2.0 per cent to 2.5 per cent), despite the 
observed negative rates of inﬂ  ation and the length of 
the recession. In consumer surveys, expected inﬂ  ation 
Source: Consensus Economics
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crisis period. For example, the Michigan survey indi-
cates that U.S. consumers believed that inﬂ  ation 
one year ahead would fall between mid-2008 and 
late-2008, but they did not expect deﬂ  ation. In fact, 
consumers’ inﬂ  ation expectations remained close to 
the average of 3 per cent reported for the last decade 
(Chart 4).
22 Thus, in both types of surveys (house-
holds and professionals), long-term inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions remained well anchored, and the central banks’ 
credibility remained intact. 
22 Although there appears to be a persistent upward bias in consumer 
surveys, one observes that consumers’ inﬂ  ation expectations move 
roughly in line with the inﬂ  ation expectations of professional forecasts. 
For example, the Bank of Japan’s consumer survey of expectations 
of inﬂ  ation one year ahead for March 2008 was 7.6 per cent, while 
the Consensus inﬂ  ation forecast for the same period was 0.4 per 
cent. While less extreme, the Michigan survey of households also 
reports inﬂ  ation expectations that are on average 0.5 percentage 
points higher than typical expert forecasts (from 1996 to 2008).
Chart 2:  Inﬂ  ation expectations in emerging-market 
countries
Six months ahead
Note: The index is constructed by aggregating responses and assigning a value of 1 to lower  



















Chart 3:  Bank of Canada Business Outlook Survey
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The survey data suggest that inﬂ  ation expectations, 
while volatile in the short run, are well anchored for 
longer horizons. However, since many surveys occur 
only quarterly or semi-annually, they may not have 
captured the true volatility of inﬂ  ation expectations 
during the crisis. To address this issue, we examine 
BEIRs for the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Japan.
23 As in the surveys of profession-
als, expectations for long-term inﬂ  ation for the United 
States remained well anchored, except for a brief 
period at the height of the crisis, when BEIRs fell to 
close to zero. In Japan, BEIRs fell below zero in 2009 
(Chart 5).
24 In contrast, inﬂ  ation expectations for the 
inﬂ  ation-targeting United Kingdom and Canada 
remained above 1 per cent during the crisis for the 
BEIR measures considered. 
Lessons from recent evidence 
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis highlights the usefulness of 
inﬂ  ation expectations within the framework for con-
ducting monetary policy. Before the crisis, energy and 
food prices increased signiﬁ  cantly, and expectations 
for shorter-term inﬂ  ation rose accordingly. Expecta-
tions for long-term inﬂ  ation remained well anchored, 
however, since households and ﬁ  rms were able to look 
through the commodity-price shock. This anchoring of 
expectations allowed policy-makers to look past the 
increase in energy prices, avoiding a possible policy 
mistake (in the absence of well-anchored inﬂ  ation 
expectations, central banks may have been forced 
to raise interest rates just as the crisis was about to 
intensify, only to reverse them later). Clearly, the 
gains associated with well-deﬁ  ned inﬂ  ation objectives 
and enhanced credibility helped to anchor inﬂ  ation 
expectations and thus the inﬂ  ation outcomes for 
many central banks. 
The experience of the crisis 
emphasized the importance of 
well-anchored inﬂ  ation 
expectations. 
23 BEIRs may suffer from liquidity risk: while there are deep and liquid 
markets for regular, nominal return bonds, this is less true for real 
return bonds, and their implied yield may therefore be biased.
24 Expectations of negative inﬂ  ation for Japan are not surprising, given 
Japan’s recent experience with deﬂ  ation.
The experience of the crisis itself, from the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers onwards, again emphasized the 
importance of well-anchored inﬂ  ation expectations. 
In the autumn of 2008, commodity prices fell dramat-
ically, and fears of a severe recession intensiﬁ  ed. In fact, 
expectations for inﬂ  ation 4 quarters ahead also fell 
sharply, and even went negative in some jurisdictions 
(market-based measures revealed a similar pattern). 
However, longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations remained 
well anchored, despite the opening of large and likely 
persistent output gaps. This clearly indicates that 
central banks maintained their credibility, despite the 
massive shocks that were affecting the economy. The 
maintenance of well-anchored expectations assisted 
the recovery, since the economy avoided a potentially 
destabilizing deﬂ  ationary spiral.
Conclusions and Avenues for 
Future Research
Inﬂ  ation expectations play a critical part in the conduct 
of monetary policy, providing timely and useful informa-
tion with respect to the central bank’s credibility. 
Inﬂ  ation expectations form a key part of the informa-
tion set used by central banks to understand and 
forecast inﬂ  ation. Importantly, much of the existing 
research indicates that central banks that have a clear 
and credible commitment to low and stable inﬂ  ation, 
especially those with inﬂ  ation-targeting regimes, have 
been very successful in anchoring inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions over the past two decades. 
Inﬂ  ation expectations will continue to inform policy-
making, as central banks seek to withdraw from the 
extraordinary measures enacted during the crisis and 
beyond. In normalizing monetary policy rates, inﬂ  ation 
expectations will be monitored closely, given the 
crucial role of credibility in anchoring inﬂ  ation expect-
ations. Massive ﬁ  scal stimulus packages and future 
pressure on ﬁ  scal budgets related to demographic 
change have led to record ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits and to high 
projected ratios of debt to GDP over the coming years 
in many advanced economies. Some market partici-
pants have expressed concerns that debt levels may 
become unsustainable and will eventually be monet-
ized (although this concern has not yet materialized 
in measures of inﬂ  ation expectations). In such an 
environment, inﬂ  ation expectations can provide a 
useful leading indicator of whether ﬁ  scal and monet-
ary policy credibility has been maintained. 
Further research is required in several areas. First, 
how households and market participants form inﬂ  a-
tion expectations is not well understood. Bernanke 
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learning and imperfect information in the modelling 
of inﬂ  ation and of inﬂ  ation expectations. Second, 
both survey and market measures exhibit biases over 
time. Accounting for these biases when interpreting 
measures of inﬂ  ation expectations requires further 
consideration. Finally, more cross-country data on 
inﬂ  ation expectations are needed, especially on the 
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